BBC Radio: BBC General Carter with Ashraf Ghani (Former President of Afghanistan:
Mr. President, It is very good to talk to you and I’m absolutely delighted that you felt able to have this conversation. And of course, it’s just over 100 days since Kabul fell, and the Taliban came to power. And of course, you and I, as actors in all of this spoke a lot in the days leading up to what, of course occurred. And it’s been difficult not talking to you since then but it’s great to be able to have a conversation some 100 days downstream from that. And I think the first thing I thought I’d like to explore in our conversation, is, of course, many of us were rather shocked by how quickly the Taliban came to power in the middle of August this year. And of course, with that, you know, how quickly you left the country. And I thought it’s a good opener, we should perhaps, discuss why you left. And I wondered if you’d like to explain all of that to me, so that we understand sort of what happens over that weekend. It’s the 14th or 15th of August, this summer.
President Ghani:
Thank you, General. It’s very good to see you and talk to you. And indeed, we’re both actors. And I’d like to thank you, and the British government and the British people for the help and cooperation that you extended over the 20 years, particularly after the time that you served as the deputy commander of ISAF and in your subsequent functions.
I’ll get straight to your question.
My first reason for leaving was to prevent the destruction of Kabul.
Kabul had been destroyed in the internal Mujahideen struggles for power and reduced to a shell. Two different factions of the Taliban were closing in from two different directions. And the possibility of a massive conflict between them that would destroy the city of 5 million and bring havoc to the people was enormous. I had made it very clear that I was not going to become an Assad.
Second by staying I would have legitimated a violent coup. This was a coup. It was not an agreement, all the previous statements by the Taliban regarding their conduct had been violated.
Three, I wanted to make sure that by leaving a road for a genuine political settlement was opened and not simply a takeover legitimated. Taliban’s takeover has not brought peace or national unity to Afghanistan. What we need is genuine peace and national unity.
And lastly I did not want to give satisfaction to Pakistan’s ISI to humiliate the Republic and compel a statement under duress. Or worse than that, to interrogate an Afghan President, all of these were possibilities.
But the fundamental reason I left, and that gets to your second question, is that our security forces collapsed, all the ministers, and the National Security Adviser came and informed me that they could not defend Kabul, that they did not have the force in the whereabouts. If you want to get to the triggering events or to why then be I’d be happy to answer that question.
Gen Carter:
Thank you, it must be an extraordinary that particular day that Sunday. I mean what was your sort of memory of when you woke up that day and how you saw it all unfold
President Ghani:
Events leading to that are important. The night before Secretary Austin had informed me that 3000 American troops were going to come to secure Kabul airport. But he said, “they are not there to defend Kabul, I repeat, they are not there to defend Kabul”.
Bismillah Khan, the Minister of Defense called me in the morning to say that Taliban were amassing, and that close air support was not being provided. Equally, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on either Thursday or Friday, stopped the flow of money from our reserves. We had $9 billion reserve approximately, most of it, 5 billion of it there. And every month 200 million would come. It was stopped and Secretary Blinken explained that this was out of fear that the money might get into Taliban hands.
Also, it had been repeatedly made cle to me that the Taliban did not want to deal with me. And you in your active role, part of the discussion that I had,said “find a dignified way to get the Afghan people involved” and my insistence was on a Loya Jirga. That was combination internationally.
Nationally, a group of people came, President Karzai, Dr. Abdullah and others, saying that they needed to be appointed as an authoritative group to negotiate with the Taliban, and I gave them that authority.
With those two actions the security and the political, the Republic, as an institution was coming to an end. I could not legitimate the end of the Republic. And there was no legal mechanism for me to transfer power to anybody but vice president Amrullah Saleh. And it had been again made clear that not only I was not acceptable, but Vice President Saleh wasn’t acceptable either.
In this environment, on the morning of that day, I had no inkling that by late afternoon, I will be leaving. We were informed not by international actors, meaning NATO and United States but by Mr. Rahimi, that the Haqqanis would be committing themselves to not enter Kabul. But two hours later, this was not the case. A Representative of the Emirates also came that morning, and explored ways to be able to get the Taliban to come to a political settelement.
I was asked and gave permission to a number of my colleagues, including the National Security Adviser, to leave. And I also asked my wife who was very reluctant to leave and they left. An hour and a half before. I was waiting, I received a call from Bismillah Khan saying that there’s collapse. And I was on my way to the Ministry of Defense. I waited for 25 minutes. The vehicle didn’t come. Then, Dr. Mohib, the National Security Adviser with the chief of PPS (Presidential Protective Service) Mr. Kuchai came and they said PPS has collapsed. If I take a stand, they will all be killed.
They were not capable of defending me and Dr. Mohib was literally terrified. He did not give me more than two minutes. My instructions had been to prepare for departure for Khost. He told me that Khost had fallen and so had Jalalabad.
I did not know where we will go. Only when we took off, it became clear that we were leaving. And I had made no preparation, including with you (If I can call you that in public, you’ve been among my closest international friends), for asking for help, or for relocation. All I had discussed with you and if you recall is should there be a political agreement and Taliban would want me to leave Afghanistan, I would like to consider a place that was to be neutral. So I could serve and go back. So this really was sudden.
Gen Carter:
I see that. Did you think? Do you think there’s a sort of a view that perhaps an alternative way of looking at it was that if you’ve stayed and had been able to be essentially protected in the palace, that would have prevented the vacuum that eventually occurred? And was that something that went through your mind at the time?
President Ghani:
The Vacuum could not be done for the following reason. Yesterday, you had on BBC, a whistle blower, on British plans for evacuation. He mentioned 15,000. An Evacuation policy had been decided and carried out by all our NATO colleagues.
Gen Carter:
Although to be fair, nobody implemented the evacuation policy so I think people realize that
President Ghani:
No, that’s not true. It was going to happen. That’s not true. Look at the offer to all the counterterrorism units in Khost, in Jalalabad in Kandahar, in Kabul. Our generals were approached. Members of the National Security directorate, the most vital for intelligence were evacuated. So there is a psychological environment (that was being created).
But the other point, General Carter is extremely important. Police in Kabul was not reformed. The army was relatively reformed but only relatively. Only Vice President Saleh, by chairing for a year, every day, the detailed, law and order situation of Kabul had brought a degree of order. And the Taliban were inside the cities now you are having records. Who would have I worked with? People in the PPS alone, they stripped under the flag all their uniforms, put on afghan clothes and disappeared. Hindsight is extremely important but the other side from my perspective was: Would I be under the gun forced to legitimate an illegitimate violent takeover?
Gen Carter:
Because what’s so extraordinary what’s so extraordinary about this, Mr. President, is that you at the beginning of August, I mean, you were saying I think probably to the Afghan parliament that you’d be able to sort this to build a fix it would be able to hold Kabul, and I even remember myself writing an article in The London Times at the beginning of August, saying we must get behind the Afghan government. It is entirely possible. If the key provincial capitals are held by the Afghan government, that we will still be able to find the means of getting to a political solution to this whole conflict. And it is remarkable how quickly it all unraveled between the first week of August and then what happened by the middle of August.
President Ghani:
Absolutely, And then here we come to a series of issues.
One is our logistical dependence. The entire Afghan security sector’s logistics and supply chains were dependent on US contractors. American evacuation was completed by first of July. And with this, the focus was on the troops. But the story for the enablers was really the contractors – there are different estimates , so I want to mention anywhere from 1000- 17,000. All our supply chains were under immense pressure.
Second, the Afghan forces had been dependent on close air support, particularly the army from its inception and were unable to operate at the tactical level, when the strategic threats got combined. Meaning, for instance, 6000 police, in order to fulfill their commitment to transparency and anti corruption had not been paid for six months.
They were these forward bases in all locations that were being supplied by air, their evacuation brought an immense set of chain reaction, but the most significant General Carter from military perspective for your consideration, Afghan notions of strategic terrain, and economy of force did not coincide with the international perspective. The Afghan conception of strategic terrain are districts and provinces that produce a chain reaction, a domino effect.
From our international colleagues perspective, these were spaces not patterns and cascading effects. So if we wanted to defend Kabul and Kandahar, which were the key strategic terrain, because the south, the east was secured both Nangarhar and Paktia and helped. Our inability, we just didn’t have the forces, as commandos had been spread tactically.
The issue here is tactical uses trumped strategic considerations. Attending to the urgent resulted in ignoring the important just in time. Compare it to COVID, or to a natural disaster. The best systems in the world have not been able to rise to the occassions rapidly. Within two months to think through the entire logistical chain. When I made the assurances, I had not fully realized the extent of our dependence, because we had been given indications that alternatives will be provided. But to the last day of August 14, alternatives to the contractors were still being searched for. The other part is now the enemy.
Gen Carter:
And before we go on to the enemy, do you think that you know as the Commander in Chief to all intents and purposes, you had enough authority and the ability to influence this?
President Ghani:
No. No. Because the security sector, had several characteristics that are not under my considerations.
First, in Kandahar, did I appoint the police chief or was he imposed on me?
The entire territorial army, local police, and popular uprisings ,etc, were done with the local influentials. And who collapsed first? There is a lot of consideration and argument that was a warlord strategy possible? But, it is the warlords that collapsed.
Gen Carter:
Should we come back to that? Because I think it’s a really important point when we perhaps look at the campaign more generally. It seems a couple of things I just wanted to finish off on on the events in August, which I think certainly Afghans will probably want to hear your perspective on. And the first one of which you’ll know and I know you’ll want to, to deal with this head on is that the US Congress, I think has recently asked John Sopko, the US Inspector General for Afghanistan, to invest allegations investigate allegations that when you left the country that a certain amount of money went with you, and I think you probably want to to answer that And I think the other question I think that many Afghans would want to hear is, you know, they’ve obviously heard the explanation given for why you left when you did. I just want to have, it must be really difficult for you personally, to leave at that point, given, you know, the amount of commitment you’ve made to the Afghan people into the country over seven years.
President Ghani:
Absolutely. It’s the hardest thing. And because of that, you know, for the past 100 days, I’ve been writing, I’ve been alone, I’ve been reflecting. There couldn’t be a harder thing. I had to sacrifice myself in order to save Kabul and to expose the situation for what it is: a violent coup, not a political agreement, or a political process where the people have been involved.
Second, I want to categorically state, I did not take any money out of the country. The helicopters, in our first destination, were available for everybody to search. And not only I welcome an inquiry by Mr. Sopko, I’d like an inquiry and as I had suggested earlier, as soon as this allegation were raised, by the United Nations, or an investigative firm.
You’ve known me for years. Have I ever asked for a visa, for a favor, for any consideration? if I wanted to make money, when I left the Ministry of Finance, I could have formed a contracting company, or a firm or others. I have not worked a day of my life, for any of the countries, including the United States. I have not received any secret money from the United States or NATO or other countries. I have not received money from the National Director of Security, unlike all the political elites of Afghanistan, who had to be accommodated through this.
And I worked without salary and benefits as Minister of Finance, as Chancellor of Kabul university, and during the transition period. During the presidency, my salary went to pay for the office of the First Lady, because there was no legal mechanism to ensure that.
My style of life is known to everyone. What would I do with money? I mean, that’s the real fundamental question. You know, my basic needs are extremely simple. I receive a pension from the World Bank, which allows me to have no accounts outside the country. My wife’s property is ancestral in Lebanon, we don’t have anything. That’s it. My daughter and son live a completely open and clear life. I’ve not had a partnership with an Afghan or foreign firm or anybody else. This is an accusation, particularly coming, first part from Russia and then circulated.
So I would be delighted to have any kind of investigation including taking a lie detector test or anything else that is important. I stand out for my commitment to my country. Unlike others, I did not come, because of a special relationship with intelligence agencies, or other things. I’m a self-made man who made his fortune. When I came to Afghanistan, I sold my house in Bethesda to build my house in Kabul. And again, I declared my assets both when I became President 2014 and then again in 2019. I declared the $5 million asset and cash which I had. It was my personal (money), with which I intended this was to build a cultural center in my ancestral village with an Agricultural Research Center. I had no other intention. And the only asset that I have today is my house in Kabul, which again can be investigated fully. I have not transferred any money out of Afghanistan, I’ve transferred my assets continuously to Afghanistan.
Gen Carter:
Thank you, Mr. President. for that clarification. I know that that’ll be very helpful to a lot of people who, of course, wondered about it. Perhaps we could go back to the deal that was signed on the 29th of February 2020. And I wonder if there’s a feedback on it, if there’s anything that you felt that perhaps could have been done differently, that perhaps you could have done differently, that might have led to a better outcome from that deal?
President Ghani:
In order to understand February 29, we first have to understand the course of 2018. It’s ironic because the dates come repeatedly the same.
On 28 February 2018, I convened an International Conference in Kabul and offered peace to the Taliban. This was followed by an international conference in Tashkent where the region endorsed the approach. It was followed by an Ulema conference in Kabul that asked for a ceasefire and immediately I declared ceasefire in June of 2018. It was the first comprehensive ceasefire in the country’s history since 1978. This was followed (and again you were involved) by discussions between Indonesian, Saudi, Pakistan and Afghan Ulama.
Then the July 17 2018, NATO Summit fully endorsed my approach to peace, and this was followed in November by an international conference of all the donors and Afghanistan partners in Geneva, again endorsing. We had a truly Afghan led and Afghan owned conference, I mean, peace proposal peace process that was endorsed nationally by the Islamic scholars worldwide, by the region and the international community. So it’s not that suddenly the United States appeared on the scene and tried to broker peace. It was my request that the US designate, as a special Ambasador, as Special Envoy to help us with Pakistan and others. And Ambassador Khalilzad was appointed to do this.
But the other point to bring to your attention, which we’re fully aware of is that on August 21 2017, President Trump announced the Afghanistan, South Asia strategy. In that strategy, he articulated why he decided not to leave Afghanistan. He asked the Afghan government for measurable, real result oriented reforms, and he directly addressed Pakistan, saying stop harboring terrorists, etc. It was that space that we used and the assurance in this statement on peace.
The people of Afghanistan had grown tired of the war. You know, a lot of the attention has been on the never-ending war, from the perspective of our allies, particularly our most important partner, the United States. But the never ending war was what the people of Afghanistan were experiencing. The cost benefit changed. And people were demanding peace. So I pushed for this peace process. And the peace process was nationally arrived at, it was transparent, and it was within roots. What happened on the 29th of February 2020, is that instead of a peace process, we got a withdrawal process. So that’s the first part. When President Trump
Gen Carter:
Sorry, When you say a withdrawal process, you mean a US
President Ghani:
A US withdrawal process. By then the Taliban were classified as the world’s deadliest terrorist organization. This from the global index on terrorism. They were costing about 18% of the Afghan GDP and it rose subsequently to about 19.7 %. The agreement was what President Trump had said it would not happen – a time bound scheduled withdrawal.
The Second part about this, is that there were two agreements on that day. Two events. The first took place in Kabul. Secretary General NATO, Stoltenberg and Secretary of defense Esper came to Kabul first and announced a joint communique. This had been worked for months in parallel with the agreement with the Taliban. And….
Gen Carter:
Sorry this was a joint communique between them and…
President Ghani:
Yes, US States, NATO, Afghan government, all allies. Because my question has been; Do we need a new agreement, which substitutes for the bilateral security agreement (BSA), Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) and the status force agreement (SOFA) with NATO? Their lawyers looked and said No, all those agreements are affirmed, joint communique will address this and again I asked Vice President Saleh and other colleagues were there, Ambassador Khalilzad repeated, in case of conflict between the two agreements which prevails? He Said, “the joint communique because this is with a recognized government”. But, when you look into the agreements, the four parts in the two agreements are radically different. In that sense…
Gen Carter:
so I think you need to explain that the other agreement is the agreement between the
President Ghani:
US government and Taliban in the afternoon of February 29 in Qatar. It was signed by Ambassador Khalilzad in the presence of Secretary of State Pompeo. In Kabul, Secretary Esper said “this is a conditions based agreement”. And he said again, “I repeat this is a condition based agreement. And if the Taliban do not abide by their commitments, it will be cancelled by the United States”. Secretary Stoltenberg said, “we are not going to allow for the loss of gains of the last 20 years. NATO will stand with Afghanistan and the Afghan people. This is the time to really take the step forward for peace.” But, in the agreement with us, with the Government of Afghanistan, the people of Afghanistan, it is clear that ceasefire, political discussions are connected with US withdrawal and the principle was “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”.
But when you look into the US Taliban agreement, it says that a ceasefire will be an issue of discussion between the two sides. And here also, it’s extremely important to understand, the Taliban were accommodated by saying the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which is not recognized by the United States but there is not a single mention to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, In the US Taliban agreement. It was reduced to saying Afghan sides will negotiate with the Taliban while in the agreement with us it is clear that an inclusive delegation of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan will negotiate with the taliban.
Also, in the agreement between the US and Taliban, the Taliban are endowed with characteristic of the state, they were not supposed to issue visas, passports to terrorist organizations.
And the most significant issue that really is probably one of the most important reasons for the events of August, [is that] in the agreement with us {and this had been subject for discussion for months} it stated that the US will facilitate a discussion between the Islamic Republic and the Taliban on release of prisoners from both sides. And the numbers that were orally mentioned are probably a couple of 100 at most. In the US Taliban agreement, the US makes a unilateral commitment to secure the release of up to 5000 Taliban prisoners and that’s by 10th of March.
Gen Carter:
Had they not consult with you?
President Ghani:
No. We had rejected this. Absolutely. Because I studied all the peace agreements, you know I do my homework. And this without a ceasefire [in return]. A comprehensive and permanent ceasefire that again, Secretary Esper and Secretary General NATO had repeated as essential. And we had secured one [ceasefire of 2018]. There was no consultation with us.
In addition to that, the United States unilaterally committed itself to releasing the remainder of Taliban prisoners within three months after. Ironically, then it says that the United States respects the sovereignty of Afghanistan and will not interfere in its internal affairs. Based on the joint communique in our detailed discussions, when I was asked in a press conference, I said this is a subject for discussion
An ultimatum was delivered that we needed to release them. The numbers were at first a couple of 100. We got to a 1000 and then it was a total insistence on the entire 5000 including 400 who had killed NATO member country troops, France and Australia particularly, were highly concerned about this, US, including 40 of the largest drug dealers probably in the world.
That’s when I had to ask for a Loya Jirga to consider their release. And again there’s a letter from Secretary Pompeo directly assuring the Afghan people of couple of things: One, it says, that the United States will hold the Taliban to their commitment to reduce violence substantially and to engage in direct negotiations. And second it says, the United States seeks a sovereign, unified and democratic Afghanistan that is at peace with itself and its neighbors. Secretary Pompeo called me and assured me and said prisoners are not your leverage. The United States is your leverage. But none of these commitments came true. So when we look in retrospect, the erasure of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan from the document became the ground [for the August collapse].
The Taliban refused to engage in a political discussion with us, saying who are you and even on prisoners, they said this is a US commitment that the US is going to deliver. So it is important to recognize that an Afghan owned Afghan led process, which was regionally supported, internationally endorsed without any discussions [was being quietly discarded]. The level of secrecy General Carter was such that Ambassador Bolton, the US National Security Adviser, was not given a document to keep. He was asked, this is in his memoire, “The Room Where It Happened”, he was asked to read [and give it back]. No document was given to us and hundreds of comments were not taken into account.
Process wise, outcome wise, the responsibility has to clearly rest with the team in particularly the question is how did State Department lawyers allow for two radically different agreements because the difference cannot be bridged. And our negotiating team I think did an extraordinary job in being unified and being focused on the key values. My promise to the people of Afghanistan was transparency in the peace process, because peace needed to be transparent to be enduring.
One last observation, in January of 2019, I wrote to President Trump saying if you would like to withdraw, please let us have a discussion on all outstanding issues. And if you have concerns, I invoked the bilateral security agreement and the Strategic Partnership Agreement. Then in April, I wrote a letter to Secretary Pompeo, explaining in detail that the process that is being followed under the name of peace was chaotic. It was bringing divisions within Afghanistan. There was
Gen Carter:
Did you get responses to these two letters?
President Ghani:
I got a response in one sense and in another sense. One response was that the CIA director and the Commander of CENTCOM came. They took notes of our concerns but they could not answer anything. You know this, the fundamental issue here General Carter is, the security sector was convinced that it was in the US interest to remain continuously. They could not of course speak for their Commander in chief, and they said he could change his mind any time. That lulled our [security] people, because they were working at the tactical level.
To the second, I got a real response; there was a campaign across the board against me that Ghani is the obstacle to peace with headlines internationally and a national campaign. Yes, I got the response. And the other response, of course, was the letter of Secretary Pompeo in black and white, assuring the Loya Jirga of Afghanistan that the United States will stay with us, with these values, and that we should take the risk on peace because it was. And there, We had complete agreement. I was a champion of peace. I ran on the peace platform. But to have believed in the assurance is my responsibility that I will take to the grave with me.
General Carter:
Understood! Just a little bit, because of course, you know, the other powers in the region are fundamental to this and of course, Pakistan and you member in the second half of 2018, You invited me to act as an intermediary between your government and the Pakistani government. What did you hope to get out of that process?
President Ghani:
Common Interest: In here, what I had framed, our relationship with them and you recall, I went to Pakistan, met with the General Chief of Staff General Rahel Sharif, and all others. And I even went to GHQ for which I was criticized but that’s the reality of the so called Afghan file. It’s been always with the deep state.
We were in a state of undeclared war. And I wanted an end to that war. And I wanted an agenda of real cooperation with Pakistan. The problem that now I look back at it, all of us should have paid a lot more attention, is the September 12, 2001 speech of General Musharraf, then military ruler and President of Pakistan. It is worth watching, CSPAN has the full text. He is an extremely haggard looking man and says Pakistan has had to make an existential choice. This moment is a moment of test of survival of Pakistan and he has made a decision to side with the United States. He does not know what they’re asking. This humiliation because they’ve been given an ultimatum is something that I think Pakistan never lived up. Pakistan has a deep state. That deep state has enormous, staying power tactically, and they showed this during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and they’ve shown it again during the American war in Afghanistan.
The United States did not find the way to really deal with Pakistan. What I was hoping you would do and you tried your best, because you had a very different relationship and could be listened to, is to arrive at an understanding that a stable Afghanistan a prosperous Afghanistan was to the benefit of Pakistan, not to its harm. We had a lot to offer in terms of cooperating on regional issues. And all we wanted was our sovereignty. But with full understanding that Pakistan was an essential element to that sovereignty. What I could not discuss because I did not have the authority is to discuss the Durand Line. Afghanistan just needs a much stronger government, a stable government to be able to discuss it. Everything else was on the table in order to be able to get out of an informal relationship, to a really state to state relationship.
And unfortunately, despite your attempts and mine, other considerations prevailed and Pakistan is a fundamental challenge to international sovereignty and to rule of law, and to international cooperation. They feel wounded because they have cooperated in moments of crisis, but then they get to be forgotten. And now again, it’s a pyrrhic victory.
They have succeeded relentlessly in achieving and the hand of general staff behind Taliban is visible. Without sanctuary, without support, without medicine, without all those supplies, particularly for carpet bombing that Afghanistan endured, it could not. And today, Pakistan’s ambassador is sort of strutting around as though he is a Viceroy in the order of the Russian ambassador and the American ambassador. They don’t have it. It needs engagement.
The lesson is that Pakistan with its population, its location, its military nuclear capability, and I think Pakistan was particularly after President Trump’s 2017 South Asia strategy very genuinely concerned about the threat to its nuclear facilities. Because President Trump openly said we’re not going to allow your nuclear facilities to fall in the hands of terrorists. Harsh language, in relationship to Pakistan without follow up actions in diplomacy doesn’t work. It enrages them.
The result was a massive increase in violence in Afghanistan, and then a change of mind in the United States. And again, one issue here to the extent to which I know there was no National Security Council meeting of the United States to review the February 29 2020 agreement. The only meeting took place much later. And because of it all the stakeholders who spoke to me from the security sector, may have not realized whether President Trump really had instructed a withdrawal, or it was perceived or what else but that’s something that the future needs to reveal.
General Carter:
Indeed, And of course, that’s a segue way into you know, what you think about the future? I mean, I think many of us are watching with some concern the extent to which Islamic State seems to be becoming a phenomenon. In Afghanistan, of course, we’re all very worried about the possibilities and the likelihood of humanitarian disaster. As this winter unfolds, and probably a drought thereafter, and I just wondered what your view is on the future.
President Ghani:
Thank you. That’s my main focus and concern, First, on terrorism.
Terrorism as President Obama described it in his Nobel Prize speech, the tragedy of 9/11 was committed by a few small men with huge grudges, marrying an old tactic with technology. Terrorism today is an ecosystem General Carter.
As organizations, al Qaeda and ISIS may have been degraded. As ecosystems we are really dealing with the fundamental challenge. The Afghan people have a fundamental question: Was the agreement with the Taliban based on an outsourcing of counterterrorism to Taliban and Pakistan? Or was it a genuine attempt to find a way out?
Taliban claim to security emanate from a very simple fact, they stopped the violence. They were the source of the violence. So they have not brought security, it is that they stopped but the other kind of insecurity, killing of members of the security forces, the Violence Against Women, forced marriages and others are speaking of this.
There is a major issue. And some lessons I think, are extremely important. I wrote an article in September 27 2001, it is called the Folly of Quick Action. It appeared in the Financial Times. In which I said, you know, you need to go to Afghanistan with a plan. Otherwise, you risk a lot.
The War on Terror was declared. The armies were put in charge, intelligence were given such broad powers and an immense amount of what should have been; A quest for justice took the form of revenge. The war became tactical, it wasn’t strategic. It became an ever widening thing.
So first, the most significant problem was to describe terrorism as Islamic terrorism. There is no relationship between Islam and terrorism. When for the last 200 years, members of every other religion have resorted to the tactic of terrorism. it was never described in religious terms. So all of a sudden you got a billion Muslim’s problem, and the invasion of Iraq, was a turning point in breaking down regional consensus.
We need regional consensus, we need the consensus of the Islamic world. So my first issue here is decouple Islam and terorrism. Islamophobia will be costly. We’ll be reproducing this violence
Second, It should be much more an intelligence, policing, economic and political operation, for us to really combat. Three, Europe and Asia now need to take the lead because the threats come and will be directly affecting [them]. And Pakistan needs to be dealt with. A medium term plan with staying power to help Pakistan stabilize. It is a very difficult situation and the blowback, unfortunately in terms of radicalism has started.
Gen Carter:
Going back to the future itself, I mean I understand that, it is really more what you sort of predict and whether you share our concerns about the rise of ISIS as a phenomenon inside Afghanistan gain. And of course, I think you were just about to pick up about the humanitarian crisis.
President Ghani:
I do share your concern, because for years I have been asking all western intelligence agencies to focus with us on terrorism as an ecosystem and come with a coherent strategy to deal with it. You cannot deal with a phenomenon ISIS, Alqaeda, or at that time Taliban with them, on a tactical level. Combination of war battles is not going to make a strategy for war. So we need this reflection. ISIS is rising because the violence that Taliban unleashed is now being turned against them. They are their students. They are being inspired by them. Unfortunately, an entire generation has learnt nothing but fighting, suicide bombing. You know, suicide bombers were auctioned.
The Taliban are not learning from Afghanistan history. Seizure of power with violence has [always] resulted with violent overthrow. Denying all afghans the opportunity to be part of an inclusive national peace has resulted in new waves of violence. And the international community, unfortunately, in the two major interventions, the emphasis was on use of massive force and the belief that the superiority of force would provide an answer. There has to be a genuine peace plan for Afghanistan. Now they are there, and they have to take responsibility.
The humanitarian situation
Gen Carter:
Sorry, before you go on to the humanitarian thing, a lot of people are discussing whether this Taliban is different from the Taliban pre 2001, I mean, do you think they are different? Do you think that they learned from the fact that Afghanistan of twenty years has changed?
President Ghani:
The signs unfortunately are not good. For change to register, first they need to understand what was the price of this pyrrhic victory. There is no taking of responsibility. I mean, just look at the Arghandab valley, look at the cold blooded execution in Spin Boldak and others. The level of violence that they unleashed. Ofcourse, they [themselves] were subjected to violence and that is what produced them, and one has to understand that.
Second, they are going for total monopoly, without acknowledging that they don’t have the skills. And third, which has been extraordinary disturbing, Mullah Hassan’s brief statement, again audio, that they cannot be held responsible for current the humanitarian situation, or the collapse of the economy, or the flight of the people. Thousands of people are voting with their feet.
Why did the chaos in the Kabul airport happen? Why did 200,000 people leave? Have they believed that things had changed, they would have stayed. The Taliban need to acknowledge the diversity of Afghanistan. They need to acknowledge that in 20 years the country has changed and it is important to be able to talk, and also it is extremely important that the west does not impose a group of warlords on them.
Gen Carter:
Do you think If you stayed, you would have been able to make them understand all of this?
President Ghani:
NO. Because, unfortunately, I was painted in total black, because we were never given the opportunity to sit down with them. Ambassador Khalilzad sat down with them. It became an American issue. Not an afghan issue. They erased us.
I think now it is possible to engage in a real dialogue. Because they lack the most fundamental thing. Legitimacy. They lack national legitimacy and they lack international legitimacy. So what is crucial, what is in the hands of international community, particularly the region, is to act united on the issue of legitimacy. Not go separate ways, the way they did it with peace. Because politically, what was the heart of the matter, General Carter, we genuinely, I particularly, believed that there was no military solution. So regardless of the level of violence, to the last day we pursued a political solution.
The Taliban, and its backers, ISI, believed that there was a military solution. And they fully engaged in that. The campaign that they carried out, the level of violence that they unleashed, and its methodic preparation. Where was the political process in all of this ? The political process..
General Carter:
I was going to say, you know, how would you advise the international community to engage with the Taliban, your point that there must be an opportunity to help them recognize that they need legitimacy.
President Ghani:
Well, the following, We need an agenda that focuses on legitimacy, peace, belonging, opportunity and hope. Legitimacy is the fundamental issue but it is not going to happen overnight. We have to carry this five dimensional process simultaneously. And Hope is my first beginning. The population of Afghanistan is 41.5 million people. By march of 2022, about 90% of this population is going to face starvation. The economy is collapsing on itself. It is not that politicians that technicians and others have left, they are dismantling [the existing structures]. I fed the people to the last day and had to.
There are certain issues of engagement that I think issues of international public goods. The first, a humanitarian crisis is not going to benefit anybody, particularly, Europe and Asia. There will be a huge wave of migration. Two, you will not be dealing with just 41.5 million inside the country, you essentially, dealing with 80 million problem, the Pashtuns in Pakistan who self identify as Afghans, it is a historic relationship that is unique, the diaspora and the 6 million refugees and others. This requires urgent attention.
So there are two ways, One we can work bottom up with the society and the minimum capacity that is needed from the state and the Taliban need to cooperate with this in order to open up a way for dealing with the problem. We are going to deal with the second year in a much more, I hope to God that it doesn’t happen, but the environmental predicitons are for a massive drought. We need to be able to create agricultlural stabilization. The urban population is folding in upon itself because there is no employment. I can suggest a dozen ways to deal with this.
Second, there is a question of regional public goods. Before that, Covid, we controlled. But the fourth and fifth wave of covid is a global issue. There are certain issues that are regional and again the migration of people, the crime, drugs, etc… in other words, there has to be an agenda of discussions with the Taliban regarding what space that is already opened. Repeating the distinction, that this is humanitarian and the other is development and relying solely on the UN agency is a waste of time.
There is a lot of capabilities in Afghanistan and can be mobilized. I will be delighted to provide very specifics. If hope is engendered, you are going to get a space. Opportunity is for those groups that are not getting paid. Neither the civil servant and of course the entire security sector not getting paid. And particularly the women, they are near starvation. How do we make sure to draw the distinction? Because here, it is the question of conditionality.
Peace
There cannot be legitimacy without peace. Peace requires, in my humble submission to the international community, don’t pick winners. Let the process take hold. The Loya Jirga is an incredibly national process. Don’t impose a set of.. there should be a set of sunset and sunrise clauses for a number of years.
Gen Carter:
You ought to explain to the listeners what a Loya jirga is? How it is organized and what it can achieve?
President Ghani:
Sure, a Loya jirga is one of our ancient institutions. All afghan ethnic and linguistic group share it, because the word jirga is both in turkic and dari language and loya means the great or grand council. It is been highly democratized, because the process of selection takes place through election by the stakeholders. The last two that I had the honour of convening involved 27 strata of the population with enormous presentation of women and youth and others. The loya jirga gets organized usually around now, 50 committees, and those committess deliberate and come to specific issues. It is a form of legitimacy that is truly deliberative and rooted in the ground. This is what also created the transitional government in 2002 and approved the constitution [2004].
What are the rules by which the Taliban rule? Who is accountable to whom? There has to be this basic set of things. Ofcourse, the issue is, Afghans need to reach an agreement. If you exclude any lingiuistic or ethnic group in Afghanistan or special location or other, you are asking for a proxy war. The Taliban need to understand that repeating the mistakes of the communists and the mujahideen are going to haunt them. They are on that pathway. Exclusion, solely relying on force, on killing, doesn’t work. Afghans want services, they want opportunity. That is what is crucial to this process. Discussions is required on genuine understanding. If they have problems with certain individuals, exclude them. Let us agree that for x number years, certain individuals are not running for office or doing other things. We need to put the nation above individuals.
Also, there has to be accountability for corruption. You ask me point blank, I am asking for full investigation of everybody that has served in the afghan government from 2001 till now. Let every international record be revealed on who has been paid what? And also the abuses. If people have been give 50,000 acres of land by a single signature, it needs to be accounted for. But if they want to forget this and move forward, that again must be the choice of the Loya Jirga. We need to arrive at an agreement and say that the definition of security is broader than the absence of war. It has to be about human security, about engagement.
No afghan can be denied belonging. This land belongs to all of us. Women and men. Speakers of different languages. You know, we have 34 languages, 4 major ones, etc… we need to be given an opportunity to arrive at this. And this requires the international community to learn from its mistakes and to not engineer a process. Become a catalyst in this process.
The question of regional public good, there are lots of projects under way, General Carter, TAPI, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan India pipeline was supposed to reach Herat by now. The railway project, the transmission lines, the water project. 26 medium size dams are under way that can work to move quickly to deal with the drought.
People, the urban issue. The most significant issue from the international perspective, from the humanitarian side, 5 million people have electronic IDs, particularly most of Kabul. The electronic ID, plus the reforms that we had done in the central bank and the ministry of finance can allow for cash payment directly to the population. There are ways to deal with the humanitarian situation that are cost effective and can allow people to breathe.
There is a sense that people literally are not breathing. They are suffocating. The cultural notions of how we interpret islam, because that is our largest source of unity has to be left to us. The Islamic world has to be brought to this.
My last point is the market, which is likely to be a much more powerful force than foreign aid. A dollar of export at times translates to 100 – 200 dollars in aid. Aid has not been effective. It has been tactical. It again, UK is amongst exceptions, particularly reliance on contractors and outsourcing, focusing on microlevel accountability rather than the macro level processes needs to change. So there is an opportunity. The region will have to own Afghanistan.
General Carter:
Yea, Indeed. I think we have been talking for a long time, and I just wondered, you have had know quiet a long time, a 100 days to sort of reflect on what has happened, your long association with the government and the country, do you have any personal regrets about how it all happened. How do you feel? We would be very interested to know, what it means to you, given your commitment?
President Ghani:
My life work has been destroyed. My values have been trampled on. And I have been made a scapegoat. I came to Afghanistan being extremely aware of my sense of mortality. As a cancer survival, I had lost 98% of my stomach to cancer in 96. I have nothing but a desire to serve. I spent my entire life reflecting on Afghan history, on the region and I thought I had articulated a vision that could allow us to overcome a fundamental dilemma.
The united states and our western colleagues have a choice, either change the nature of the war on terror or withdraw. But for us, national autonomy could not be achieved when the war on terror was raging. Because all our other considerations were subordinated to it.
General Carter:
Yes, Ofcourse, and I think, I know your personal commitment, you have said very publicly that for you, when you were a president, it was a fight to the death, everything associated with that and I think you know, there are many afghans who blame you as their leader for what has happened. You know, I think probably, you ought to give them an answer about all of that.
President Ghani:
Of course. The blame is totally understandable, because anger is our predominant status. In the course of what they rightly blame me for, they have total right, is that I trusted in our international partnership and pursued that path, instead of confronting and continuously [object] like my predecessor. I really followed and you have personally witnessed this, all the pressures to be able to avoid this outcome. But, they also need to realize that continuous imposition from the outside limited both the opportunity and my authority, after all 50% of the cabinet was allocated to Dr. Abdullah and his colleagues. The contradictions of the one hand trying to empower and create opportunity and the other hand [trying to reform the] security sector.
For the time being, what I ask my fellow country women and country men is to reflect whether humanely it was possible to adjust and make a decision to reform the system sufficiently to fight and win a war when we are in a battle. Politically, the republic had lost support. Our regional relationship were subordinated to our relationship with our international colleagues. And they all wanted, our immediate neighbors, the United States to be out.
With time, I hope there will be a sense of understanding but I completely understand the anger, because I share that anger more and the frustration. The reason I am focused to be able to follow a genuine way forward is again for not any personal agenda but to be able to help Afghanistan acquire a sense of direction where we can all again belong together. And here, again there is a lesson for the international community.
A neutral Afghanistan is a much more enduring entity than an Afghanistan that is turned into a battlefield or subordinated to war from outside. So we need to get the region and the international community to really come, morally, to assistance. Now we are not front page news, and we will not be likely. There will be other things and this is what I brought continuously to the attention of my fellow Afghans.
Was there more we could do, certainly. But I put, on average 14-16 hours a day. During my time in office, I had a four-hour break in Bamian twice. Other than that, it was all work. Was is possibly humanly? We have to look back and hindsight is 20-20. But if we had known the withdrawal was an issue, and had my letter in 2018 been answered positively, the outcome would have been different. But we were assured that we will receive backing for a Peace. Unfortunately that did not happen. But that’s again, part of the order of the world.
All of us made a huge mistake in assuming that the patience of the international community would last. And the lesson is that we need to come to a pathway for a true national reconciliation and autonomy and accountability to each other so we can live back together.
Gen Carter;
Thank you Mr. President. There is a lot we can learn from that conversation. I am very grateful for having you with me. And I think as we look forward, we all want what is the best possible outcome for Afghanistan. I think what you say about engagement and how it should be conducted is a wise advise. Thank you for being with us this morning.
President Ghani:
Thank You General and thank you to the BBC.
